A central issue in applying auction theory in practice is the problem of dealing with budget-constrained agents. A desirable goal in practice is to design incentive compatible, individually rational, and Pareto optimal auctions while respecting the budget constraints. Achieving this goal is particularly challenging in the presence of nontrivial combinatorial constraints over the set of feasible allocations.
INTRODUCTION
A large part of auction theory deals with the problem of designing truthful mechanisms for quasi-linear settings. For these settings, the VCG mechanism, or variants of it like affine-maximizers, can be applied to get optimal or nearoptimal auctions. However, when we deviate from the quasilinear model, very little is known. One of the most natural and practically important feature missing from the quasilinear model is the presence of budget constraints. Budgets play a major role in several real-world auctions where the magnitude of the transactions involved naturally put a financial constraint on the bidders. Examples of such auctions include those used for the privatization of public assets in eastern Europe, or those for the distribution of radio spectra in the US (for a discussion on this, see Benoit and Krishna [6] ). Another important example is that of Ad Auctions where advertisers explicitly declare budget constraints. In such settings, respecting the declared budget constraints is a necessary property any mechanism must satisfy. There is much discussion on the source of budget constraints (we refer to Che and Gale [11] for a detailed discussion on this topic).
Satisfying budget constraints while keeping incentive compatibility and efficiency is a challenging problem, and it becomes even harder in the presence of complex combinatorial constraints over the set of feasible allocations. In the presence of budgets, individual rationality and truthfulness cannot be satisfied at the same time as maximizing social welfare [14] , and thus the goal of maximizing efficiency can be achieved mainly through Pareto-optimal auctions 1 . Therefore, a desirable goal under budget constraints is to design incentive-compatible (IC) and individually-rational (IR) auctions while producing Pareto-optimal outcomes. The first successful example of such mechanisms was developed in the seminal paper of Dobzinski, Lavi and Nisan [14] , where the authors adapt the clinching auction framework of Ausubel [5] to give a truthful mechanism that achieves Pareto-optimality. Their setting, however, captures only a simple allocation constraint: there is a limited supply of k items and each player has a value of vi for each item (and hence value of vi · t for getting t items) and budget Bi.
As for more general allocation constraints, there have been 1 An auction is Pareto-optimal if it outputs an allocation and payments such that no alternative set of allocation and payments improves the utility of at least one agent and keeps the other agents at least as happy as before. Here agents include bidders and the auctioneer where the auctioneer's utility is its revenue a couple of subsequent work capturing special families of allocation constraints, e.g., unit demands [2] , or multi-unit demands with matching constraints [18] . Although these results are mainly based on Ausubel's clinching auction, each of them need to develop independent techniques to deal with their specific environment -for example, Fiat, Leonardi, Saia, and Sankowski [18] define a complex clinching procedure based on trading paths in a bipartite graph and computing S-avoid matchings. Our goal in this paper is to extend these results to a much more general class of polyhedral constraints. In particular, we would like to understand for what polyhedral environments one can design such auctions, and also identify simple environments for which designing such auctions is not possible.
Our Results and Techniques. Firstly, inspired by an application in Sponsored Search Ad Auctions and several other applications, we study polymatroid constraints over feasible allocations and give an auction that achieves all the desired properties, i.e., it satisfies IC, IR, and produces Pareto-optimal outcomes while satisfying the budget constraints. We assume that the budgets are public -which was shown in [14] to be a necessary assumption 2 . While following Ausubel's framework to design this auction, we need to invent the main component of the mechanism, i.e., the clinching step that copes with the polyhedral allocation constraints. Our clinching step uses submodular minimization as a subroutine and only needs a value oracle access to the submodular function corresponding to the polymatroid. As a result, our mechanism has a clean geometric description that abstracts away the combinatorial complications of previous designs. This leaves the auctioneer free to focus on modeling the environment, and then use our mechanism as a black-box. This general technique not only generalizes (and simplifies) the previously known results like multi-unit auctions with matching constraints [14, 18] , but also extend clinching auctions to many other applications like the AdWords Auction and settings like spanning tree auctions and video on demand [8] . Our main application is in sponsored search auctions where we model the AdWords Auction with multiple keywords and multiple position slots per keyword as a polymatroid called the AdWords polytope (See Section 4.1 for details).
In order to extend this result to more general polyhedral constraints, we turn our attention to 2-player auctions with budget constraints and prove several structural properties of Pareto-optimal truthful auctions for polyhedral environments In particular, we present a characterization of such auctions that results in various impossibility results and one positive result. On the positive side, we present a truthful individually rational Pareto-optimal auction for any environment if only one player is budget-constrained. On the other hand, if more than one player is budget-constrained, we illustrate simple polytope constraints for which it is impossible to achieve a truthful Pareto-optimal auction even for two players. Moreover, as a byproduct of this characterization, we get an impossibility result for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal utilities. This impossibility result disproves an implied conjecture by Ausubel [5] which has been reinforced by follow-up papers [14, 21] . In fact, this conjecture was reinforced by the fact that getting such an auction is possible whenever the marginals are flat. In appendix D we provide an explicit counter-example for this case.
Applications to Sponsored Search. Online advertisement is a growing business that was worth 25 billion dollars in 2010. It also has become a central piece in the current internet landscape, since it is the primary way internet companies monetize their services. Large part of this revenue comes from the search advertisement, hence it is not surprising that is has been extensively studied in the literature. The basic model of sponsored search ad auctions was proposed simultaneously by Edelman, Ostrovky and Schwarz [16] and Varian [31] . The authors model the current auction as a non-truthful mechanism and analyze its equilibrium properties. The social welfare of such equilibria were studied in [28, 22, 10] and its revenue properties in [23] .
In search advertising, there are usually multiple keywords and each keyword has multiple slots associated with it. Most of the previous work treat auctions for different keywords as being independent, and therefore focus on a single keyword. A recent paper by Dhangwatnotai [13] approaches the problem of analyzing keyword auctions for multiple keywords, but it is restricted to a special case of one slot per page. Similarly, the work of Fiat et al [18] can be seen as an auction for multiple keywords with only one slot per page.
To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first work to combine multiple slots per page and multiple keywords. We do so by giving a non-trivial characterization of the set of all feasible allocations of clicks: we call it the AdWords Polytope. We show it has the structure of a polymatroid and therefore we can use our result to generate a truthful Pareto-optimal auction for this setting.
Other Related Work. There are two streams of related work. The first, like ours, is on designing truthful mechanisms when players have budget constraints with the goal of achieving Pareto-optimal outcomes; for example, [14] , and [18] . Bhattacharya et al [7] show a budget-monotonicity property for the clinching auction of [14] , therefore arguing that no player can improve his utility by under-reporting his budget. For the case of unit-demand players, Aggrawal et al [2] design auctions for unit-demand players with budget constraints.
On the question of maximizing revenue, Borgs et al [9] gave a truthful auction whose revenue is asymptotically within a constant factor of the optimal revenue. These results were improved by Abrams [1] . Subsequently, Hafalir, Ravi and Sayedi [20] relax the truthfulness requirement, moving to ex-post Nash equilibrium as a solution concept, and give an auction that, in equilibrium, has good efficiency and revenue properties. More recently, Pai and Vohra [29] gave a revenue-optimal auction for the Bayesian version of the problem. We would like to highlight that the above work focused on the multi-unit setting only.
Our auction also generalizes the ascending auction of Bikhchandani et al [8] . The authors consider environments where the set of allocations is defined by a polymatroid, but don't consider budget constraints.
The second line of related work relates to the practical problem of designing mechanisms for Ad Auctions. The work of Feldman et al [17] design an auction for the envi-ronment with one keyword and multiple slots. Their model is, however, different from the standard utilitarian utility model. Instead of being profit maximizers, the players are clicks maximizers, i.e., the players want to get as many clicks as possible without exhausting their budget and without paying more per click than their value, which is a simpler setting than ours. In order to design their auction, they describe the structure of the set of possible randomized allocations of players to slots. We note that the structure they identify is in fact a polymatroid and use this fact to apply our auction to this setting. We further extend this characterization to the setting with multiple keywords.
Also for one keyword and multiple slots, Ashlagi et al [4] design an auction for the usual utility model but relax the truthfulness requirement and get an auction that is Paretooptimal for all ex-post Nash equilibria. The main weakness in the setting of [4] is that the agents are allowed to be allocated only to one slot position for all the different queries of the given keyword. However, in reality, agents can be allocated to different slot positions for different queries of a given keyword. In the restricted setting of [4] , the Paretooptimality requirement becomes easier to satisfy.
Independently of our work, Colini-Baldeschi et al [12] also study the problem of designing incentive compatible, individually rational, budget feasible and Pareto-optimal auctions for sponsored search. The authors present two auctions satisfying those properties: one for the case with a single keyword but multiple slots with different click-throughrates and one for the case of multiple keywords and multiple slots with homogeneous click-through-rates (i.e. all slots are identical).
Impossibility results. The impossibility of a Paretooptimal auction for heterogeneous goods in the budgeted setting was given in [18] . It remained an open problem whether an auction was possible if goods where identical, i.e., utilities depended only on the number items acquired and not on which items they were. A very recent result by Lavi and May [21] shows an impossibility result for the case where the valuation can be an arbitrary function of the number of items -i.e. players are allowed to express complementarities. Since their setting is more expressive, an impossibility result is easier. Our impossibility result for multi-unit auctions can be seen as a stronger version of their result, since we allow players only to express valuations with diminishing marginals. This came as a surprise to us, since it was generally believed that such a positive result could be achieved using a variation of [14] .
AUCTIONS FOR POLYHEDRAL ENVIRONMENTS
Consider n players, where player i has a positive value vi per unit of some good g and a budget of Bi. We assume that the valuations are private information of the players, whereas the budgets are public. We are also given a subset X ⊆ R n + that defines all the possible ways to allocate the good g. We assume that the subset X is a convex set that is bounded and downward closed 3 . We will call this set X an environment. Note that if player i receives xi amount of good g and pays pi, her utility ui is equal to vixi − pi if pi ≤ Bi and −∞ otherwise. However, since we will require the mechanism to never charge more than the budgets, we won't have to deal with the latter case. Our goal is to design an auction mechanism that elicits valuations v from the players and outputs a feasible allocation x(v) ∈ X and a feasible payment vector p(v) ≤ B that satisfies the following three properties:
• Individual Rationality (a.k.a. voluntary participation): Each player has net non-negative utility from participating in the auction, i.e., ui ≥ 0.
• Incentive compatibility (a.k.a. truthfulness) : It is a dominant strategy for each player to participate in the auction and report their true value, i.e.,
The characterization of single-parameter truthful mechanisms in [25, 3] states that this is equivalent to xi being a non-decreasing function of vi (for a fixed v−i) and payments being calculated by
• Pareto-optimality: An allocation x(v) ∈ X and payments p(v) ≤ B is Pareto-optimal if and only if there is no alternative allocation and payments where all players' utilities and the revenue of the auctioneer do not decrease, and at least one of them increases. In other words, there is no alternative (x , p ) such that
and at least one of those inequalities is strict.
Next we prove a useful lemma about the structure of Pareto-optimal outcomes.
Proof. In order to show the ⇒ direction, assume there is a dominated direction d such that d t v ≥ 0 and di ≤ 0 for all i that have pi = Bi. Then define x i = xi+di and p i = pi+vidi and we obtain same utilities and the total payment didn't decrease, since
is not in the boundary of the polytope, we can give some more of good g to some players without charging extra payments and increase their utility. Therefore (x, p) is not Paretooptimal.
For the ⇐ direction, suppose (x , p ) is a Pareto improve-
and at least one inequality is strict. Summing them all, we get that i vixi < i vix i , which implies that d t v > 0. Now, consider two cases: If x i ≤ xi for all i with pi = Bi, then di ≤ 0 for all such i. Simply pick some i for which di > 0 and decrease di slightly. The result will be a dominated direction d (since
Summing all those inequalities, we get
Another simple observation is that if (x, p) is a Paretooptimal outcome in which no budget is fully exhausted, then x = argmax x∈X v t x. For small valuations, any Paretooptimal mechanism that satisfies individually rationality cannot exhaust budgets, so it must behave like VCG.
Polymatroidal environments
Our most interesting applications correspond to settings where the environment is a packing polytope P = {x ∈ R n + ; Ax ≤ b} for some m × n matrix with Aij ≥ 0 and b ∈ R m + . We call such environments a polyhedral environment. Examples of polyhedral environments are ubiquitous in game theory (see [26, 27] 
for many examples).
A rich subclass of packing polytopes is the class of polymatroids, which are polytopes that can be written as P = {x ∈ R n + ; i∈S xi ≤ f (S)} where f : 2
[n] → R+ is a monotone submodular function, i.e., a function satisfying:
Such polymatroidal environments generalize matroid environments. It is easy to see that all previously studied settings are instances of a these environments: Dobzinski et al's result [14] corresponds to the uniform matroid and Fiat et al's result [18] corresponds to the transversal matroid. Bikhchandani et al [8] give many examples of polymatroid environments including scheduling with due dates, network planning, pairwise kidney exchange, spatial markets, bandwidth markets and multi-class queueing systems [8] . In section 4 we discuss some of those applications in more depth and present a novel application of polymatroids to sponsored search auctions.
CLINCHING AUCTION FOR POLYMATROIDS
In this section, we describe our main positive result, i.e., an auction with all the desirable properties for polymatroidal environments. This auction is based on the clinching auctions framework of Ausubel [5] .
Before we study more complicated constraints, let's recall the clinching auction [5, 14] for the multi-unit setting, i.e., P = {x; i xi ≤ s0}. We begin by setting the supply s = s0 and Bi the budget available to each agent. We maintain a price clock p that begins at zero and gradually ascends. For each price p, the agents are asked how much of the good they demand at the current price. Their demand will be di = + , which is the minimum amount we can give to player i while we are still able to meet the aggregate demands of the other players. Clinching means that player i gets δi amounts of the good, and δip is subtracted from his budget. The price increases and we repeat the process until the supply is completely sold.
The heart of the mechanism is the clinching step and generalizing it for more complicated environments involves various challenges: how does one define the notion of supply and aggregate demand (it is not a single number anymore, since there are constraints restraining the possible allocation)? Finally, we need to make sure the clinching step doesn't violate feasibility.
Clinching Framework. First, in Algorithm 1, we consider a slightly modified version of the clinching framework: we maintain a price vector p ∈ R n + and increase the prices one player at a time. The vector ρ ∈ R n + contains the promised allocations in each step and its final value is the final allocation of the mechanism. The payment of each agent is the total amount that was deducted from their budget during the execution 4 .
Algorithm 1 Polyhedral Clinching Auction
For each price, we calculate the demand di of each player, which is the amount of the good they would like to get for price p. Then we invoke a procedure called clinch which decides the amount to grant to each player at that price. We update the promises, remaining budget and adjust demands 5 . Then we increase the price. In order to define clinching, we need to define analogues of the remnant supply and to demands for the case where the the environment is a generic polytope. Instead of being a single number as in the multi-unit auctions case, the remnant supply and aggregate demands will be polytopes: Definition 3.1 (aggregate demands) Given P , a vector of promised allocation ρ ∈ P , the remnant supply is described by the polytope Pρ = {x ≥ 0;
In the multi-unit auctions case, the amount player i clinched was the maximum amount we could give him while still being able to meet the demands of the other players. We generalize this notion to polyhedral environments (the concepts are depicted in Figure 1 ):
Definition 3.2 (polyhedral clinching) The demand set of players [n] \ i if one allocates xi to player i is represented by the polytope
Since P is a packing polytope, clearly 
We need to ensure that the clinching step is well-defined, i.e., that after clinching is performed, the vector of promised allocations is still feasible. This is done by the following lemma: Lemma 3.3 For each step of the auction above, if ρ ∈ P , then ρ + δ ∈ P .
Proof. Let χ i be the i-th coordinate vector. Note that
we can show that
. The induction is easy:
This auction is clearly truthful, since each player i reports only vi, and she can stop her participation earlier (which she doesn't want, since she will potentially miss items she are interested in) or later (which will potentially give her items for a price higher than her valuation). It is also individually rational, since players only get items for prices below their valuation and respect budgets by the definition. Notice that those facts are true regardless of the trajectory of the price vector: any process that increases prices (in a potentially non-uniform way) has this property.
Lemma 3.4 The auction in Algorithm 1 along with the clinching step described in Definition 3.2 is truthful, individuallyrational and budget-feasible.
Clinching for polymatroids. Notice that we haven't used anything from polymatroids yet, so Lemma 3.4 holds for any polytope P . However, two things are left to be shown: (i) that amount clinched can be computed efficiently and (ii) that the outcome is Pareto optimal. To show both of these properties, we use the fact that P is a polymatroid.
Lemma 3.5 If the environment is a polymatroid P defined by a submodular function f , then the amount player i clinches in Algorithm 1 is given by:
δi = (maxx∈P ρ,d ½ t x) − (maxx∈P ρ,d ½ t −i x−i).
Moreover, this can be calculated efficiently using submodular minimization.
The main ingredients of the proof are the following two facts about polymatroids: 
Notice thatf (·) might not be monotone. However,
is a monotone submodular function that defines the same polymatroid. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5 :
Using the fact 3.6, we know that
Sincef is submodular, the smallest marginal can only bē
which is exactly the expression in the statement of the lemma. Now, one can easily see that evaluatingf is a submodular minimization problem. Now we prove that the outcomes are Pareto-optimal in two steps. The first step is to characterize Pareto-optimal allocations for polymatroids. This characterization is stronger than that of Lemma 2.1, since it explores the structure of polymatroids. Afterwards, we show that the outcomes of the chinching auction defined in Algorithm 1 satisfy the two conditions in the characterization lemma.
In the following, for a vector x ∈ R n and S ⊆ [n] we denote x(S) = i∈S xi. The following elementary facts about submodular functions will be useful in the proof of the Lemma 3.8: there is pi < Bi and vj < vi and no tight set separating them, then we can consider another outcome where we increase xi by some δ > 0, decrease xj by some δ < 0 and still get a feasible point improving x t v. Now, this would not be Pareto optimal by Lemma 2.1.
Fact 3.9 Given a vector x ∈ P , if two sets S, T are tight (i.e. x(S) = f (S) and x(T ) = f (T )), then S ∩ T and S ∪ T are also tight. The proof is quite elementary: x(S
∪ T ) = x(S)+x(T ) − x(S ∩ T ) ≥ f (S)+f (T ) − f (S ∩ T ) ≥ f (S ∪ T ).
So, all the inequalities must be tight and therefore x(S ∪T
For the (⇐) direction, let (x, p) be an outcome satisfying properties 1 and 2 and suppose (x , p ) is a Paretoimprovement. This means that vix i − p i ≥ vixi − pi and
Using property 2 (notice it holds for player n trivially) together with fact 3.9, we define the following family of tight sets S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ . . . ⊆ S k = [n], tight in the sense that x(Si) = f (Si). For all vt < vi 1 there is a tight set S1t that has i1 but not t. Let S1 be the intersection of such sets. Now, given S1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Sj−1, we define Sj in the following way: If ij ∈ Sj−1, take Sj = Sj−1 (notice can only happen if vi j = vi j−1 ). If not, for each vt < vi j there is a tight set Sjt that has ij but not t. Now, define Sj as the union of Sj−1 and the intersection of the Sjt sets.
By eliminating duplicates and its corresponding elements from {i1 . . . i k }, we get a family S1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ S k . Define Tj = Sj \ Sj−1 and it is clear the family obtained has the following properties:
Since the players in T j have exhausted their budget, pi ≥ p i . Using that and Pareto-optimality, we get:
Now, we can add the inequality pi − p i ≥ vi j (xi − x i ) for i ∈ T j and obtain:
Summing those for all j and get:
. Therefore i pi ≥ i p i and therefore equal. This means in particular all of the inequalities in (1) and (2) must be tight. Therefore for all i ∈ T j we need to have xi = x i , since if xi > x i then inequality * in (1) would be strict. If xi < x i , then inequality * * would be strict. We use this fact to show that i∈S j vi(xi−x i ) ≥ 0 by induction on j. If we show that, we can take j = k and then we are done, since this will imply that i vixi ≥ i vix i and therefore (x , p ) cannot be a Pareto-improvement.
For j = 1, this is trivial, since we can write:
since both terms are zero, and then sum vi(xi − x i ) for the rest of the elements in S1 and use the fact that S1 is tight. For other j, we use that:
by the fact that Sj is tight. Now, we argue that, for sufficiently small , the outcome satisfied the two properties in Lemma 3.8 and hence is Paretooptimal. We prove this fact using the following sequence of lemmas:
Lemma 3.11 After the clinching step is executed, and before updating prices,f ([n]) ≤f ([n] \ j), ∀j ∈ [n].
Proof. In the clinching step, given an initialf0, we define δi = max{0,f0([n])−f0([n]\i)}. After we update ρ, B, d, f is updated tof1(S) =f0(S) − δ(S). Now, it is easy to check that:
Lemma 3.12 The outcome (x, p) of the clinching auction is such that x([n]) = f ([n]).
Proof. 
price pi increases and di decreases by
) decreased then there was some T, i / ∈ T such that:
Using Lemma 3.11, we know thatf ([n]) ≤f ([n] \ i), so di < θ which is not true.
The proofs of the previous two lemmas intuitively establishes the maximality of the clinching procedure. Lemma 3.11 can be interpreted as saying that if we apply the clinching procedure twice, without updating prices, then the second time will have no effect. The proof of Lemma 3.12 identifies an invariant that is maintained during the execution of the mechanism.
Lemma 3.13 If < min v i =v j |vi − vj |, then property 2 of Lemma 3.8 is satisfied.
Proof. Suppose not and for the final outcome there are vj < vi, pi < Bi and all sets S such that i ∈ S, j / ∈ S are not tight. First, clearly xj = 0, otherwise [n] \ j would be tight by Lemma 3.12. Then considerx wherexi = xi + θ, xj = xj − θ andx k = x k for all k = i, j. It is feasible for some small θ. Now, consider the promised allocation ρ and demands d just before the last time player j clinched an amount δj > 0. If necessary decrease θ so that it becomes smaller than this last amount clinched, i.e., θ < δj. At this point ρ ≤ x ≤ ρ + d. By the definition of clinching:
At this point, ρ ≤ x and ρj + θ < ρj + δj = xj. Thereforẽ x ≥ ρ. Also, we have that x − ρ ≤ d and xi − ρi < di, since agent i hasn't dropped his demand to zero yet and his demand never increases and won't be met while vi < pi. Here we are strongly using that < min v i =v j |vi − vj | to ensure that for the last time player j clinches, player i demand is not zero yet. This implies thatx
, which is an absurd.
We can summarize the results as: Theorem 3.14 For a polymatroidal environment, the auction in Algorithm 1 along with the clinching step described in Definition 3.2 has all the desirable properties.
Extensions and limitations of the clinching framework:
The clinching framework described in Algorithm 1 and Definition 3.2 is quite flexible: one can change the way clinching is done or the way prices ascend and obtain an auction that is still truthful, individually rational, and respects budgets. Pareto-optimality, however, is a delicate property to achieve. A natural question is for which environments Pareto-optimality is still achievable? In appendix A, we show we can extend this framework a little further (to scaled polymatroids), but not further than that.
Faster clinching:
We showed in this section that for a generic polymatroid, we can calculate the clinched amount using submodular minimization as a sub-routine. For each individual environment, however, one can usually find much faster clinching subroutines. We illustrate this in appendix B for the single-keyword AdWords polytope.
THE ADWORDS POLYTOPE AND OTHER APPLICATIONS
We begin by discussing some interesting applications of the auction presented in section 3. Then we introduce a novel application of polymatroidal constraints to sponsored search auctions that generalizes the classical models of Edelman et al [16] and Varian [31] .
• Multi-unit auctions [14] : corresponds to the polymatroids associated with constant submodular functions, i.e., f (S) = Q, ∀S.
• Combinatorial auctions with matching constraints [18] :
[m] and bidders [n] and each buyer i has additive value 1 for each item j such that (i, j) ∈ E and value 0 for each item not connected to him. We can represent this setting by a polymatroid where f (S) is the number of items connected to some player in S. This is called the transversal matroid.
• Video on demand [8] : Consider company that provides video on demand that is located on a node s of a direct network with capacities on the edges G = (V, E, c).
Each buyer corresponds to a node in the network. An allocation x is feasible if it is possible to transmit at rate x i for each player i simultaneously. This is possible if for each subset S ⊆ [n] of players, i∈S xi is smaller then the min-cut from s to S. Using the submodularity of the cut-function, it is easy to see that the environment is a polymatroid.
• Spanning tree auctions: Consider the abstract setting where the agents are edges of a graph G and the auctioneer is allowed to allocate goods to a set only if it has no cycles. This corresponds to the graphical matroid of graph G. A more practical setting is when a telecommunication company owns a network that contains cycles and decides to auction their redundant edges. This setting corresponds to the dual-graphical matroid of G.
AdWords Polytope
Consider n advertisers and m keywords. Each advertiser i is interested in a subset of the keywords Γ(i) ⊆ [m]. For a keyword k, we denote by Γ(k), the set of advertisers interested in this keyword. With each keyword k, we associate |Γ(k)| positions. Position j for keyword k has click-throughrate α k j (possibly zero) such that α
Assuming that each keyword gets a large amount of queries, we see α k j as the sum of number of clicks that the j-th position of keyword k gets across all queries that it matches. For now, let's assume that the number of clicks a player gets in slot j of keyword k depends only on j, k and not on the identity of the player. One is able to relax this assumption, as we see later.
Let
} be the set of all allocations (one-to-one maps) from players to slots for keyword k. Also, let Δ(A k ) be the distributions of such allocations. Given that, we can define the AdWords polytope in the following way: an allocation of clicks x is feasible if there is a distribution over allocations of players to slots for each keyword such that player i gets xi clicks in expectation. More formally: 
Our main result in this Section is that:
Theorem 4.2 The AdWords polytope is a polymatroid.
In order to prove the theorem, we first consider the setting with a single keyword and all advertisers interested in it. Let the click-through-rates be α1 ≥ . . . ≥ αn. Feldman et al [17] relate the problem of deciding if a vector x is feasible to a classical problem in machine scheduling, i.e., scheduling in related machines with preemptions (Q|pmtn|Cmax [19] ). What follows is a re-statement of their characterization in a format that makes it clear it is a polymatroidal environment.
Lemma 4.3 (Feldman et al [17]) An allocation vector x is feasible iff for each S, x(S) ≤
|S| j=1 αj , where x(S) = i∈S xi for each set S ⊆ [n]. 6 Since the number of clicks is typically very large we treat them as divisible goods and consider also fractional allocations.
Notice that f k (S) = |S| j=1 α k j is a submodular function, so the set of feasible allocations for the single-keyword setting is a polymatroid.
For the multiple-keyword setting, we say that an allocation vector x is feasible if we can write xi = k∈Γ(i) x k i in such a way that the vector (x k i ) i∈Γ(k) is feasible for keyword k, i.e., x k (S) ≤ f k (S) for every S ⊆ Γ(k). The fact that this allocation set is a polymatroid is a direct consequence of the following theorem, which is a polymatroidal version of Rado's Theorem due to McDiarmid [24] . 
is a polymatroid defined by the function
.
Quality factors:
So far, we assumed that the clickthrough-rate of player i allocated to slot j of keyword k depends solely on k and j. More generally, we would like to consider the click-through-rate of a slot depending also on the player allocated in that slot. Let α k j,i be the clickthrough-rate of position j of keyword j when player i is placed there. Traditionally, we consider the click-throughrates in a product form, i.e., α
i is called quality factor. Assuming quality factors are public information, one can, in a similar way, define a polytope of feasible allocations. In general it will not be a polymatroid.
If the quality factors are uniform among all queries, i.e., γ k i = γi, the the set of feasible allocations is given by P * γ = {x; (
* } where P * is the AdWords polytope defined as a function of α k j . It is a scaled polymatroid, for which a variant of the auction in section 3 satisfies all desirable properties (see appendix A).
LIMITATIONS OF AUCTIONS FOR BUDGET-CONSTRAINED AGENTS
Previously, we argued why simple modifications to the clinching auction would not work for polyhedral environments beyond (scaled) polymatroids. Here, we explore the possibility of designing an auction of a different format achieving those properties and show that this is not possible even for two players. We do so through a general characterization of Pareto-optimal auctions with desirable properties. Before stating the characterization, we study the case with one budget-constrained player and prove some lemmas that are useful in proving the general characterization result later.
One budget-constrained player
For ease of exposition, we first focus on 2 players and assume that the feasible set of allocations P has a smooth and strictly-concave boundary, in the sense that for each
In fact, one can approximate any polytope by such a set using the technique of Dolev et al [15] . Using compactness arguments, it is possible to get an auction for the original environment by taking the limit of the auctions obtained for its C ∞ -approximations. Assume that player 1 is not budget constrained and player 2 has budget B2 and let (x * , p * ) be the VCG mechanism for this setting. Now, we can define the function:
is monotone. Moreover, when coupled with the appropriate payment rule, it generates a Pareto-optimal and budget feasible mechanism
Proof. The main part of the proof is to show that the allocation is monotone. If we show that, it is clearly budget feasible for player 2, since we use the VCG-payment rule until the point the budget of player 2 gets exhausted and from that point on, the allocation is constant. When the budgets of the players are not exhausted, the allocation is efficient (since it mimics VCG) and therefore is Pareto-optimal. The allocation when the budget of player 2 is exhausted is equivalent to the VCG allocation of a pair (v1, v 2 ) with v 2 ≤ v2, so player 1 is getting x * v2) by monotonicity of VCG. This implies Pareto-optimality as a consequence of Lemma 2.1.
Monotonicity: The allocation rule is clearly monotone for player 2. We need to show it is monotone for player 1, i.e. that the function t → x1(v1 + t, v2) is monotone nondecreasing. It is clearly so for intervals where ξ(v1 + t) ≥ v2, so let's assume that for t ∈ (− , + ) we have ξ(v1 + t) < v2. Our goal is to show that:
Since the VCG-allocation lies in the boundary of P , this is the same as showing that
The crucial observation is that the VCG-payment for player 2 on the curve (v1 + t, ξ(v1 + t)) is constant, i.e.:
Now, we can simply derivate it with respect to t. We use the notation ∂if (·) for the derivative of f with respect to the i-th variable. We also define x * v2) decreases with v1 by the definition of the VCG allocation.
A variant of the proof can be used to show the following result for 2 budget constrained players. This is useful for our general characterization. ξ1(v2), ξ2(v1) are such that the regions {v; v2 ≥ ξ2(v1)} and {v; v1 ≥ ξ1(v2)} are disjoint, then one can define
Corollary 5.2 If the functions
is a mechanism with the desirable properties.
The above corollary has a strong fixed-point flavour and it is tempting to believe one could get the existence of such a mechanism from this theorem. This is however not true, as shown in the next section. However, this result remains useful as a tool for searching for such mechanisms whenever they exist. For example, one can extend the above theorem to prove the existence of the mechanisms for polyhedral environments when B1 is much larger then B2.
Characterization and impossibility
Now we discuss our main negative result: which states an impossibility of extending the auction for polymatroids to general polyhedral environments.
Theorem 5.3 (Impossibility) There is no general auction for every polyhedral environment and every pair of budgets that satisfies the desirable properties.
We prove it in two steps: first we prove a sequence of lemmas characterizing 2-player auctions for polyhedral environments satisfying all the desirable properties. Then we fix a specific polyhedral environment and argue that no mechanism can possibly satisfy this characterization.
First, we begin by understanding the format of an auction with the desirable properties where the environment is a packing polytope P ⊆ R 2 + . We start by defining a family of VCG auctions.
VCG-family:
We say that a mechanism is in the VCGfamily if its allocation x(v) ∈ P is such that
Notice that there might be more than one such mechanism: if v is normal to an edge of the polytope, then the entire edge is in the argmax. Nevertheless, 
The proof is elementary and can be found in Appendix C. To illustrate this fact, consider the simple case of P = {x ∈ R 2 + ; x1 + x2 ≤ 1}. Then the VCG mechanism is welldefined for x1 = x2, which is, simply to allocate to the player with the highest value the entire amount. But notice that completing this mechanism with any allocation in the points (v, v) generates a truthful mechanism. The payments of different mechanisms of the VCG family differ on (v, v), for example pi (v, v) = vxi(v) , but notice that the payments everywhere else are well-defined.
Pareto-optimal mechanisms: Now we turn our attention back to Pareto-optimal mechanisms for two budgetconstrained players. Let (x, p) be such mechanism. As a direct consequence of the characterization of Pareto optimal outcomes (Lemma 2.1), we know the following:
And a simple consequence of truthfulness:
Now, we are ready to start proving the characterization theorem. We will characterize the mechanism in terms of the regions in the space of valuations where the budgets get exhausted. For formally, we are interested in understanding the sets: Proof. Assume that E1 ∩ E2 is not empty. Then we will prove the lemma in two parts. For the first part we will prove two statements:
Then for the second part, we show that this whole region that has constant allocation has budget exhausted for the two players. See figure 2 for an illustration of the proof. 
Proof. The set of vectors {u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u k } is simply the set of normals of the edges of the polytope as depicted in the first part of Figure 3 . If v is not an edge in the polytope, then the point in P maximizing v t x is a vertex and therefore uniquely defined. If we draw the lines u i ·t for t > 0 we divide the space of all possible valuations in regions (see second part of the figure): the regions correspond to the vertices and the lines to edges of the polytope. Now, given a certain mechanism (x, p), suppose that v1 < a1 the vector (v1, ξ2(v1) ) is not normal to any edge of P . Then clearly x * (v1, ξ2(v1)) is well-defined and moreover, for some δ > 0 and
Using that x2(v1, v 2 ) is constant in v 2 in this range and taking v 2 ↑ ξ2(v1), we get:
. Therefore the budget of player 2 could not have been exhausted on ξ2(v1).
The third part of Figure 3 
To see why this is true, consider v1 < v 1 and assume that (v1, ξ2(v1)) is in the line {t · u i ; t ≥ 0}. Then (v 1 , ξ2(v 1 )) cannot be strictly above this line, by a similar argument used in Lemma 5.5: look at the allocation curves x2(v1, v2) ≥ x2(v 1 , v2 ) and the payment formula -then player 2 must be paying just above the {t · u i ; t ≥ 0} for v 1 line at least as much as he was paying above this line for v1 and hence his budgets must be exhausted.
Proof of the Impossibility Theorem
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 5.3, which states that there is no general auction with all the desirable properties for all polyhedral environments P . We fix the following setting: a set of feasible allocations P = {x ∈ R 2 + ; 2x1 + x2 ≤ 6, x1 + 2x2 ≤ 6} and budgets B1 = B2 = 1. Assume that (x, p) is a mechanism with the desirable properties for this setting. We will use the characterization lemmas in Section 5.2 to find a contradiction. We illustrate the flow of the proof in Figure 4 (a brief summary of the proof is given in the caption of the figure). ), the mechanism (x, p) produces an efficient allocation (i.e., it is equal to some mechanism of the VCG family).
Proof. First notice that no mechanism in the VCG-family for P exhausts the budget in [0, 2 3 ) × [0, 2 3 ). Now, we turn our attention to the mechanism (x, p), which is a mechanism with the desirable properties for this setting.
In [0,
), player 1 cannot exhaust his budget, since x1 ≤ 3 and v1 < 1 3 . We claim that in this area the mechanism needs to behave like VCG. If there is a point in this ). We use this fact to show that the allocation must be constant in the green region (Fact 5.10), contradicting Pareto-optimality for allocation of the form (v1, v2) where
region where x(v) doesn't maximize v+,ṽ2) = (2, 2), since all inequalities must be tight. , so the budget of player 2 never gets exhausted even for v2 → ∞. This contradicts Paretooptimality for v2 > 2v1, since if his budget is not exhausted, he should get allocated at least as much as he gets in VCG.
Multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginals
As a by-product of Theorem 5.3, we can answer in a negative way the question of the existence of truthful Paretooptimal auctions for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginals. Consider the following setting:
Setting: Consider a supply of s of a certain divisible good and two players in such a way that the feasible allocations are (x1, x2) such that x1 + x2 ≤ s. Player i has a public budget Bi and a private valuation which is a increasing concave function Vi : [0, s] → R+. Upon getting xi units of the good and paying pi, player i has utility ui = Vi(xi) − pi.
It is tempting to believe that one could adapt the clinching framework in Algorithm 1 to deal with this setting, by simply redefining the demand function as something like:
where ∂Vi(xi) is the marginal valuation at xi. Indeed, if Vi(xi) = vi · xi, this recovers the original way of calculating demands. In appendix D we give a counter-example showing that the clinching framework with this new demand function results in a non-truthful mechanism. The intuition behind the counter example is that some player can increase his declared value on items he won't get anyway in order to increase the payment of his opponent, exhausting his budget earlier. This way, he is able to get items for cheaper in the end.
In the following theorem, we show that no auction mechanism can satisfy all the desirable properties for this setting:
Theorem 5.11 There is no truthful, Pareto-optimal and budget-feasible auction for this setting.
Proof. Suppose that (x(V1, V2),p(V1, V2)) is a mechanism satisfying all the desirable properties for multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginals. Then we can use it as a black-box to construct a mechanism for a general polyhedral environment, contradicting Theorem 5.3. Given a certain polyhedral environment, we can describe The mechanism is clearly truthful, individually rational and budget-feasible. It is also easy to see that sets of allocation can me mapped 1-1 between those two settings, preserving Pareto-optimality.
Our main claim here is that this auction is not truthful. We show that by providing an example: consider an initial supply of s = 2 budgets B1 = ∞, B2 = 4 and valuations:
The outcome of that is x1 = 1, x2 = 1 and p1 = 3, p2 = 1 since budgets never get exhausted. Now, we show that player 1 has a profitable deviation. He could report the following valuation instead:
The the price clock increases up to 2 without any clinching. For 2+, the demand of player 1 drops and player 2 is able to clinch one unit by the price of 2, remaining with budget 2. Now, as price goes up, player 2's demand keeps decreasing, since his leftover budget is only 2 and the price is greater than 2. As a result, player 1 will be able to start clinching at price p = 2+ and therefore will havex1 = 1, p1 < 3, which is a strict improvement over the truth-telling strategy.
